UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/669
4 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 JUNE 1994 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of Kang Sok Ju, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of the DPR of Korean delegation to the DPRK-U.S. Talks dated 3 June 1994.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) KIM Su Man
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement of Kang Sok Ju, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of the DPRK delegation to the DPRK-U.S. talks dated 3 June in Pyongyang

It is one year since the DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement was published.

The Joint Statement was the first of its kind in the history of the DPRK-U.S. relations in which the sides promised each other the ban on the use of armed forces including nuclear weapons and threat with them, mutual respect of sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. It was of weighty importance in that it laid the foundation of the DPRK-U.S. talks for a peaceful solution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and a practical end to the hostile relations between the two countries. Looking back on the past one year, however, we must note with regret that the principles of the Joint Statement have not been observed.

As everyone knows, with the publication of the Joint Statement, we temporarily suspended the effectuation of our declared withdrawal from the NPT and, even with this unique status, we accepted on the highest level the inspection of the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards.

And, fully considerate of the apprehensions of the United States, we promoted with sincerity the working-level contacts for the exchange of special envoys between the north and the south and even made a momentous decision to replace the graphite moderated reactor system with a light water reactor system at the sacrifice of the independence of our nuclear power industry.

The package solution to the nuclear issue which we were to propose at the third-round talks included all the questions in which the United States might be interested, such as the resumption of the routine and ad hoc inspections of the Agency pursuant to the Safeguards Agreement, our return to the NPT and the dismantling of the radiochemical laboratory with the replacement of the graphite moderated reactor with the light water reactor.

We do not intent to drive a bargain with the United States over the nuclear issue or get something from it in this connection. All we want is an end to the U.S. policy of nuclear threat to us and the removal of the hostile relations between us and the United States and the abnormal relations between us and the Agency. Only then can the nuclear issue be fundamentally resolved and thus peace be consolidated on the Korean peninsula and, furthermore, security be ensured in the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States, however, failed to give any practical assurances that it would renounce its policy of nuclear threat and stifling against us and, while using the phraseology of DPRK-U.S. talks, refused even to sit down at the negotiating table with us,

leading the talks to a collapse in actuality. So we have not had even an opportunity to discuss the package solution with the United States.

The past one year since the publication of the DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement has been, in the final analysis, a period in which the United States has not sought a solution to the problem through the talks but, on the contrary, used the signboard of the talks as a tool of pressure and a means of trick against us, according to the reversed mode of thinking that it would come to the talks when the problem is solved, and a period in which it forced south Korea to open its rice and arms markets over the nuclear issue and pursued only its selfish aim.

It is not difficult to see the motive of the start of the U.S.-orchestrated anti-DPRK pressure campaign over the core refueling at our experimental atomic power plant.

Core refueling is an indispensable normal process of the operation of an atomic power plant. Furthermore, as we have declared, we have taken measures to fully preserve the technical possibility of as hoc inspection of the fuel rods when our unique status will have been removed as expected and we firmly ensure the non-diversion of the spent fuel rods.

Despite our well-intentioned step, however, some officials of the IAEA Secretariat concluded that the possibility of later measurement of fuel rods was lost. The Secretariat may give up measurement, if it does not want it.

For our part, we preserve the scientific and technical possibility of it. So, if the nuclear issue is solved between our country and the United States, not only the measurement of fuel rods but even more complicated problems than that would be solved without difficulty.

The honesty of our nuclear activities in the past could be seen clearly in the well-meant step of allowing an "additional inspection" of the radiochemical laboratory.

This, notwithstanding, they tried to find fault with the core refueling, saying the possibility of measurement was lost. This is an insidious attempt to call in question our graphite moderated reactor system now in operation and put the brakes on the development of our existing nuclear energy industry as a whole, not to inquire into our nuclear activities in the past. In the final analysis, this cannot be construed otherwise than part of their political plot to stifle our system.

This is borne out by such ill-boding moves within the United States of late as open calls for "UN sanctions", "multinational sanctions" and "preemptive strike" at peaceful nuclear facilities of the DPRK.

Should the United States thus totally give up even the DPRK-USA talks now we would be left with no other choice but to conclude that our efforts for a diplomatic solution have failed.

If the United States is willing to have the talks now, our proposal for a package solution is still valid. But, if it chooses a strongarm measure, our option too will change. We will go over to the next process of our nuclear activities and cannot but expand our independent atomic energy industry by the present method.

In case the United States declares the foundation of the DPRK-USA talks has been destroyed, the foundation on which we have temporarily suspended the effectuation of our declared withdrawal from the NPT will collapse.

We have already notified the parties concerned that "economic sanctions" would be regarded as a declaration of war against us.

In this case, not only the parties joining in the "sanctions" against our Republic but also those backing such "sanctions" will be held responsible. This is not what we want.

The United States must not take our patience for a sign of weakness.